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Abstract—Industrial control systems were designed as 
closed systems without any consideration or need for Internet 
connectivity. This design choice resulted in most SCADA 
protocol implementations being plain text with little security 
against attackers. Information on SCADA systems and 
protocols is readily available in public domain, making them a 
target for malicious attacks. Network coding is a lightweight 
technique based on simple XOR operations for error 
correction that can also help secure the message. This paper 
proposes use of network coding for protection of message 
interchanges with the field devices in an industrial network. 
The results show that the proposed method effectively protects 
the communications against a malicious adversary.  
Keywords— security, industrial control systems, cyber-attack, 
SCADA, communication protocol  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used to control 
industrial processes, and are used for control and monitoring 
in many domains [1] [2]. Process control systems are used in 
manufacturing industries, similarly the building automation 
systems control the services in buildings, and energy 
management systems control the generation and distribution 
of power. Newer applications are in robotic systems and 
modern cars Engine Monitoring Systems (EMS). 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) are 
used to control and monitor an ICS over a large geographical 
area. SCADA system as shown in Figure 1 is a network of 
sensors, control devices, Human Machine Interface (HMI), 
actuators, databases and SCADA software. These systems 
manage critical infrastructures and any disruption in control 
and communications can have severe health, safety and 
financial implications.  
The initial SCADA system design was a closed system 
with no outside communication links thus precluding the 
need for any inherent protection in the industrial protocols 
[3]. However the recent technological innovations with their 
associated benefits of remote connectivity and timely event 
notifications have resulted in the integration of Internet 
connectivity with SCADA system and devices. SCADA 
Internet connectivity [3][4] exposes a lot of different 
protocols and devices that are used to transfer information 
between the sensors, Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), and mobile devices.  
Most of SCADA protocols had roots in early systems and 
were based on simplicity and obscurity of operation rather 
than security. SCADA technology and protocols are quite 























Fig. 1. SCADA System. 
SCADA systems continuously collect measurements 
from the sensors and relay commands to the control and 
monitoring equipment [3]. SCADA systems have very tight 
timing constraints and any delay or disruption can be 
detrimental to its operation [6]. The near real-time operation 
of SCADA systems and limited processing capabilities of 
field devices make it difficult to have strong encryption of 
messages. This is similar to Secure Socket Layer/Transport 
Layer Security (SSL/TLS) encryption and decryption for 
secure Hyper Text Transport Protocol (HTTPS) that make it 
slower compared to HTTP protocol. Thus, strong 
cryptographic algorithms cannot be used for protection due 
to resource constraints [7]. 
 An overview of sensor networking technologies for 
industrial applications is provided in [4]. Secure 
communications is an important requirement of the digital 
infrastructure and it is necessary to provide reliable 
communication despite presence of malicious users 
jeopardizing the normal flow of communications [8]. 
Modbus-RTU [9] was released in 1979 and is a 
communications protocol in widespread use in industrial 
applications [10]. Many security loopholes found in SCADA 
networks are in the communications protocols [7].  
The attackers also know about the weaknesses and flaws 
in SCADA security [3]. Attacks on SCADA networks have 
increased and these systems have become attractive targets 
for malicious attackers [2]. It is critical to protect these 
systems due to the vulnerabilities and increased threats [2]. 
Thus it is important to provide security to the messages 
against eavesdroppers by using simple encryption schemes 
that provide requisite protection with an affordable level of 
processing available in low power devices. 
 
Encryption encodes the messages such that it is 
unintelligible to an eavesdropper but authorized users can 
read it correctly [5]. Network coding was proposed by [12] 
and it allows robustness in data communications [13]. 
Instead of sending the source packets, linear combinations of 
packets are transmitted. The linear combinations are based 
on Exclusive-OR (XOR) operator, which is a simple 
operation to implement in hardware or software.  
This paper proposes the use of network coding for 
securing the message transfers in SCADA networks and 
demonstrates the applicability through protecting Modbus 
protocol against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
describes related work. Section III covers the background 
information. Proposed protection methodology is described in 
Section IV. The results and discussion are provided in Section 
V and conclusion is in Section VI.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A survey of protocols and challenges of Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) is provided in [14]. A review of SCADA 
components, communications protocols and security trends 
is provided in [15]. A summary of defensive measures 
against wireless industrial communications system using 
cryptographic techniques is described in [6]. Some SCADA 
protocols with increased security protection were realized 
for point-to-point, broadcast, and emergency channels [3].   
Modbus protocol can be compromised to execute 
arbitrary requests [7]. An implementation of error detection 
and correction for Modbus-RTU serial protocol is described 
in [10]. This study overcomes the limitations of SCADA 
protocols by ensuring the integrity of the messages by using 
forward error correction. 
Implementation of a secure framework for secure 
SCADA networks is proposed using moving target defence 
strategy [16]. The Internet Protocol (IP) address of each host 
is changed randomly so that the attacker cannot find it. The 
solution does not incur packet loss as compared to other 
solutions and zero packet loss was demonstrated during 
hand-off [16]. The IP based SCADA protocols  considered 
were Modbus/TCP, Distributed Network protocol version 3 
(DNP3), Profinet and Ethernet/IP [16]. 
A secure authentication for Distributed Network protocol 
version 3 (DNP3) is proposed for broadcast transmissions 
between master and multiple stations in [7]. The proposed 
scheme is validated against common attacks such as 
modification, injection and replay [7].  
A discussion on security issues and sSCADA protocol 
suite was proposed to overcome some of the limitations of 
SCADA protocols in point-to-point, broadcast and 
emergency channels [3].  
 
IEC 60870-5-101 communications protocol is used in 
SCADA systems for communications between a master 
device and remote devices in electric power industry. The 
protocol architecture does not protect the sensitive exchange 
of data between the master and slave devices [2]. An 
implementation of security for protocol is described by 
incorporating a secrecy layer between the physical and link 
layers of the protocol [2]. Variable length frames use 
encryption to hide the message. Three XOR and three 
transposition blocks were used in the cipher sublayer [2]. A 
simulation testbed was used to confirm that the proposed 
enhancement meets the temporal deadlines of electric 
substations [2]. 
A rateless application for evaluating the efficiency of 
network coding for secure transmissions is proposed in [13]. 
It was shown that the efficiency parameters need to be 
matched to the communications requirements to outperform 
routing.  
Use of network coding for protection of unicast 
bidirectional connections in optical networks is proposed in 
[17]. The use of preconfigured cycles is explained for 
generating the linear combinations of data units. It provides 
the advantage as explicit detection of failures and rerouting is 
not required [17]. 
A model for secure network coding and necessary 
conditions for its being secure are described in [8]. A method 
was proposed using precoding to transform an insecure 
network code to a secure code [8]. 
III. BACKGROUND 
In this section we provide relevant background on 
Modbus protocol, a common attack scenario being 
considered and basics of XOR and network coding 
techniques. 
A.  Modbus Protocol 
The protocol was developed by Modicon Incorporated in 
1979. It is a master-slave protocol in which all the 
communication is initiated by the master device. The slave 
devices only respond to a master query and do not initiate 
communication [9]. A summary of commands is provided in 
Table I.  
 Some of the common industrial protocols are described 
in [18]. In industrial applications, Modbus is the most 
commonly used protocol [18]. It transmits 16 bit integer data 
between the devices on the same network [18]. It is a well-
known serial protocol used with PLC for controlling a large 
variety of applications such as, bar code readers, position 
sensors, vision sensors, speed controls, etc. [19]. Modbus 
protocol uses Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) for integrity 
check and error detection. 
TABLE I.   MODBUS COMMANDS 
Code Function Reference 
01 (01H)  Read Coil (Output) Status 0xxxx 
03 (03H) Read Holding Registers 4xxxx 
04 (04H) Read Input Registers 3xxxx 
05 (05H) Force Single Coil (Output) 0xxxx 
06 (06H) Preset Single Register 4xxxx 
15 (0FH) Force Multiple Coils (Outputs) 0xxxx 
16 (10H) Preset Multiple Registers 4xxxx 
17 (11H) Report Slave ID Hidden 
 
 Fig. 2. MITM attack. 
B. Attack Scenarios 
In SCADA systems it is important that the source and 
destination of each method is identified [2] as otherwise 
potentially damaging commands could be issued causing 
damage or disruption to the physical system being controlled. 
MITM attack scenarios are shown in Figure 2. Passive 
attacks are aimed at intercepting the messages and 
interpreting them to acquire more information about the 
system under attack. Such attacks can continue over a longer 
period of time and can be difficult to detect. In an active 
attack the eavesdropper not only intercepts the message but 
also tries to discard, modify or delay the message with a 
view to compromise the system. 
C. XOR and Network Coding  
The XOR operation is similar to logical OR except that 
the result with both input bits as 1, will be 0. XOR operation 
can be efficiently implemented in hardware and software.  
Network coding combines the packets in a linear 
combination and the simplest combination operator used is 
XOR. The receiving node by applying the XOR operation 
again is able to extract the original message [20].  
Network coding is simple to implement and as a packet 
level error correction solution, performs as near-optimal 
erasure codes for sufficiently large finite field used for 
creating linear combinations of source symbols [21]. The 
complexity is acceptable for short lengths of the source 
messages [21]. 
The XOR is a lightweight operation that can easily be 
performed on a low power device. It is used in conjunction 
with other transformations in many encryption algorithms, 
such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [6] and Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) protocols. XOR is also used for 
transforming message payload of each message sent from 
browsers to WebSocket servers [22].  
Simple XOR operation can be used to create very robust 
encryption by applying a technique known as one-time pad, 
in which the source message is XOR with a random key of 
same length as the source message. This would require 
generating a new completely random key for the next 
message to be encrypted to prevent the eavesdropper from 
guessing the key. The full-length keys could also be based on 
a shorter key that generates a truly random longer bit 
sequence. The idea is similar to network coding wherein a 
seed or key value is used to generate the sequence of linear 
combinations.  
The application of XOR operation can be understood 
through a small example:  
Source message  : 0 1 1 0     1 0 1 0  
XOR Key       : 1 0 1 0     1 0 1 0 (XOR) 
Cipher text       : 1 1 0 0     0 0 0 0 
The same key can be applied again to the encrypted text 
for retrieving the original source symbol: 
Cipher text       : 1 1 0 0     0 0 0 0 
XOR Key       : 1 0 1 0     1 0 1 0 (XOR) 
Original message : 0 1 1 0     1 0 1 0 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. Attack Scenario 
We consider an attack scenario where an eavesdropper is 
able to intercept the Modbus protocol messages between the 
master and slave devices in the SCADA network. The 
attacker could thereby inject a valid message of its own in 
order to change the system state to jeopardise the system 
operation. 
B. Proposed Encryption Technique 
Network coding is based on XOR operation which can be 
efficiently implemented in hardware and the operation 
executes at much higher speed and low-cost compared to 
other encryption algorithms that might be considered.  
We propose use of a secret key or seed for network 
coding to generate the linear combinations. This short key 
can be used to generate a truly random bit sequence equal in 
length to the message to be encrypted. The security of this 
key is important to preserve the security of XOR coded 
messages.  
The robust security provided by the above scheme can 
fully secure the message against any eavesdropper provided 
that (i) the short key remains a secret; (ii) the random bit 
sequence generated using the short key is truly random (iii) 
the key is not re-used. 
An interesting feature of the XOR coding is that applying 
the XOR sequence used for encoding to the encrypted 
sequence will yield the original plain text message. Thus, the 
intended recipients in the SCADA network can recover the 
actual message quite easily.  
Normally the key used for the random network coding is 
sent along with the message for ease. We instead propose 
key sequences to be either available at both the sender and 
receiver or these could be dynamically sent by the master 
device over another secure communications channel.  
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We consider the problem of protecting the SCADA 
Modbus protocol traffic. As described above, we illustrate 
the efficacy of XOR operation through a simplified 
operation; however, it is straightforward to extend it to the 
full length of source message to be protected.  
A. Passive Attack on Modbus Communications 
In a passive attack, the eavesdropper can access the 
ongoing communication but does not change it. This might 
be to gain more information about the SCADA network to 
launch a more serious and involved attack.  
Modbus messages could be of different lengths based on 
the number of slave devices and the particular function type. 
For illustration, consider a source message of length 32 bits 
as, 
01101011 00101010 10111100 10101010 
Using a 32 bit secret key,  
11010001 11001100 01111000 01011011, the encrypted 
message would be, 
10111010 11100010 11000100 11110001 
 It can be seen that if the key is not known to the 
eavesdropper then it is highly unlikely to decipher the 
message. The seed of length 32 for a random number 
generator has 232 possible values giving 4 billion 
combinations. Although this can be broken in finite time by 
trying all possible combinations but that would require that 
eavesdropper has requisite processing power and more 
information about the network. Also, as the next Modbus 
command would use a different key, the eavesdropper cannot 
infer the plain text message conveniently, and at best can 
infer information about the Modbus network devices. 
B. Active Attack on Modbus Communications 
In an active attack the eavesdropper can not only access 
the ongoing communication but also proceeds to duplicate, 
distort, or replace it.  
As illustrated in the Section above, once the 
eavesdropper is able to decipher and understand the ongoing 
Modbus commands and responses flowing in the network, it 
will be too late to make any use of this information as next 
time around a new key will be used. Thus, it is no longer 
possible to modify these in any meaningful way without it 
being detected.  
The only possibility remaining for the attacker is to 
replay an intercepted encrypted message. However, as 
described, this would also be caught as an invalid message 
due to the updated key and will not be decoded to a valid 
command and hence ignored. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The protection of message interchanges between SCADA 
system and its devices has assumed more importance with 
the SCADA interconnectivity with Internet of Things 
devices and the Internet. The low power devices are not 
capable of strong cryptographic algorithms and such 
techniques which might also violate the timing constraints of 
SCADA system. This paper has proposed a simple technique 
for message protection based on network coding and key 
management that can effectively counter and limit the 
actions of an eavesdropper.  
In our future work we will extend this work to other 
SCADA protocols and communications scenarios to 
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